LA ESTRATEGIA ALEMANA Y EL PROGRAMA DE CONSTRUCCIÓN NAVAL

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LA BATALLA DEL ATLÁNTICO DESDE UN COMITÉ. GUERRA ECONÓMICA Y ESTRATEGIA BRITÁNICA.

por Christopher Bell - Dalhousie University


Marc Milner, The Battle of the Atlantic (St Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 2003).


DEL ASDIC AL FIDO. EL DESARROLLO TECNOLÓGICO ALIADO EN LA BATALLA DEL ATLÁNTICO.

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AUGE Y CAÍDA DE LAS BASES ATLÁNTICAS ALEMANAS DE SUBMARINOS.

por Lars Hellwinkel

Wilhelm Fahrmacher / Walter Matthiae, Lorient. Entstehung und Verteidigung
Sönke Neitzel, Die deutschen Ubootbunker und Bunkerwerften. Bau, Verwendung
Bio. Lars Hellwinkel.
EL “MAYO NEGRO”.
LA DERROTA DE LOS SUBMARINOS.
por Duncan Redford – University of Portsmouth

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Notas
2. TNA, ADM 199/2060, Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, December 1943, p. 3
12. TNA, ADM 223/15 ff. 194-6.
FREIKORPS DÖNITZ. VIDA DIARIA
E IDEOLOGÍA DEL CUERPO DE SUBMARINOS.

por Keith W. Bird.

Bibliografía


Notas

1. The most useful of the many studies for this topic include the superb monographs of by Michael L. Hadley, Count Not the Dead: The Popular Image of the German Submarine (Annapolis, 1995) and Timothy P. Mulligan, Neither Sharks Nor Wolves: The Men of Nazi Germany’s U-Boat Arm, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, 1999). Cf. French L. MacLean, Dönitz’s Crews: Germany’s U-Boat Sailors in World War II (Atglen, PA, 2009). See Nico Sutter’s Der U-Boot Mythos in Deutschland: Ursachen, Gründe und Folgen (Hamburg, 2013) for an excellent summary of the evolution of the U-Boat myth in Germany. Jak Mallmann Showell’s popular well-written books are also useful sources for many different aspects of the U-Boat war.

2. Given wartime and post-war data issues, losses of personnel and U-Boat losses have varied. See http://uboat.net/ for details. The figures cited here are from the revised and corrected edition of Alex Niestlé’s German U-Boat Losses during World War II (London, 2014), pp. 1-4. During some periods between 1943 and 1945, one out of two U-Boats failed to return.

3. See in particular, Dönitz’s Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage (Bonn, 1958) and Raeder’s Mein Leben, 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1956-1957). Both memoirs are available readily in English and supported by a “solid phalanx” of the post-1945 memoirs and papers written for the British and Americans for their analysis of the naval war (see G.H. Bennett and R. Bennett, Hitler’s Admirals (Annapolis, 2004). Cf. Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, MA, 2006), pp. 229-235, for how the former leaders of the Wehrmacht wrote the history of World War II from “their point of view.”

4. Churchill, The Second World War, 2 (London, 1949), p. 529. At the same time, Churchill insisted that the air offensive against German should receive the highest priority and he was “optimistic that the situation at sea would never become critical” because of the U.S. shipbuilding capacity and the ability to quickly divert air resources to the Atlantic if necessary. See Christopher Bell, “Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic,” The Journal of Military History, 79 (July 2016), p. 637. Cf. Alan J. Levin’s “Was World War II a Near-run Thing?” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 8 (1, 1985), pg. 41, who argues the vulnerability of England outside help to secure the resources to avoid an “inevitable, if not quick and easy” defeat. Clair Blair’s two-volume detailed research of the U-Boat war agrees with Hadley’s Count Not the Dead that the U-Boat war...
was the most mythologized weapon of both world wars. Those histories written after 1945 reflected a combination of German and Allied propaganda, the embargo on the Allied code-breaking successes, and a lack of understanding for the technology and limitations of submarine warfare. For Blair, the U-Boat peril...has been vastly overblown: threat inflation on a classically grand scale.” Hitler’s U-Boot War (New York, 1996), I, pp. xi-xiii.

5. Although the term “undefeated” was used by Dönitz in his final address to his men, Mulligan, Sharks, p.88, quotes a U.S. Navy’s history of signals intelligence operations written at the end of the war that notes the U-Boat arm was not defeated at sea in May 1945 but had made up their losses and “reappeared in force.” See Keith Bird, “Karl Dönitz-Der ‘unbesiegte’ Admiral,” Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches (Berlin, 1995) pp.129-152.

6. See the ensuing uproar against Michael Salewski’s critical presentation on the ideology and reality of the “Maritime Third Reich” at the navy’s 1985 conference on its role in the turbulent politics of the period 1848-1945 period. Given the challenge to the existing historical perceptions of the former Kriegsmarine participants, who took “at face value” the apologia of the wartime leaders and the “heroic literature” of the navy’s “clean” war and considered Salewski to be attacking Dönitz and their own service. In a process that, would prove to be as painful as it was long, it was not until 1998 when the navy declared that its members were democrats of deep conviction and were worlds apart from the generations who served with conviction the Kaiser or “Leader Principle.” See Michael Salewski, “Die unsichtbare Flotte. Deutsche Marinegeschichte—eine Randnotiz?” pp. 120. Von den Historikern für die Flotte: Die 50. Historisch-Taktische Tagung für Flotte (Bochum, 2011). Salewski: Marine und Geschichte—eine persönliche Auseinandersetzung (Bonn, 2011), pp. 131-132. Dieter Hartwig, “Von der taktischen Anweisung zum Bildungsprogramm-Geschichte und Entwicklung der HiTaTa im Spiegel ihrer Themen,” Von den Historikern für die Flotte, pp. 107. Like Buchheim (see “Buchheim Controversy” below, scholars such as Salewski or top U-Boot commanders were attacked for “the fouling of their own nests.” There is still evidence that this controversy persists to the present given those who see ideology or disrespect for the sacrifice of Germany’s WWII veterans as playing a factor in the debate about the past. For the “tonnage war” critique, see Werner Rahn’s analysis of the failure of Dönitz and the U-Boot leadership in their failure to assess the Allied capabilities “Allied Sea Transport Capacity as a Strategic Problem of the German Naval War Effort,” Germany and the Second World War, Vol. VI (Oxford, 2001), pp.326-341.

7. See Michael Salewski’s Von der Wirklichkeit des Krieges: Analysen und Kontroversen zu Buchheims “Das Boot” (Munich, 1976) who discusses the public perception of the book and how the war had been filtered by the “media.” For the reality of the veterans, argues Salewski, it was the product of “their own existential and therefore subjective isolated, experience” as well as the idealized perception fostered by the idealized literature and documentaries. A disappointed Buchheim charged that the critically acclaimed film version was “another re-glorification and re-mystification of the U-Boot war, German heroism and nationalism.” See Hadley’s detailed account of Buchheim’s critical response to the film and his subsequent publications and television and the publication of his photographs in his chapter, “Revising the past: The Buchheim Wave, 1973-88.” in Count Not the Dead, p.165.

8. See Keith Bird, German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature (New York, 1985) for the new research that resulted from the accessibility of the naval archives to the mid-1980s.


11. See the protests of the U-Boot veterans against the government’s refusal to allow any participation of any members of the armed forces in uniform at Dönitz’s burial in January 1981 as well as documentation from a number of commentators and the press including the Minister of Defense as well as members of the veterans’ associations. Walter Frank, ed. Dönitz (Wilhelmshaven, 1981).

13. Erich Topp, Fackeln über dem Atlantik: Lebensbereicht eines U-Boot-Kommandanten (Herford, 1990), pp. 95-97, 100-103. Hadley, Count Not the Dead, p. 168. Among the plethora of U-Boat accounts, in addition to Topp, the following are among the most illuminating and reflective: Peter Cremer, U-Boot Commander Peter Cremer: A German Sub Commander’s View of the Battle of the Atlantic (Annapolis, 1984) Timothy P. Mulligan, Lone Wolf: The Life and Death of U-Boot Ace Werner Henke (Westport, CT, 1993)

14. Dieter Hartwig’s Großadmiral Karl Dönitz: Legend und Wirklichkeit (Paderborn, 2010) represents the long awaited critical analysis of Dönitz’s life and career and, in particular, his network of supporters and postwar defense of his wartime leadership. Dönitz’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief replacing Grand Admiral Erich Raeder in January 1943 was a result of Hitler’s rejection of Raeder’s emphasis on capital ships and led to the navy becoming virtually “a U-Boat navy” after 1943.

15. See Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, pp. 257-257 for the shattering of the “clean war myth” as a combination of the ongoing research into the involvement of the military with National Socialism that resulted in a new “Traditions Decree” of 1982, (an unjust regime such as the Third Reich cannot be a source of tradition”). This attitude, in spite of opposition from the conservative Christian Democratic Union, Veterans’ Associations, and the “traditionalists” reinforced the government’s rejection of the navy’s former commanders as role models for Germany’s new Bundesmarine. The “historians’ quarrel” of 1986-1987 revived the discussions over the role of the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust—a debate that led to a much wider public discussion over the nation’s “collective memory” of the war with the opening of the “Wehrmacht Exhibition” 1995-1999 and the documentation of the military’s role in the crimes of National Socialism.


17. In addition to the essential studies by Hadley, Count Not the Dead and Mulligan’s, Neither Sharks nor Wolves, see Eric C. Rust’s excellent Naval Officers under Hitler. The Story of Crew 1934 (New York, 1939).

18. Ben Scott, “The Origins of the Freikorps: A Reevaluation,” University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, pp. 1-10 and French MacLean, Dönitz’s Crews, pp. See Keith Bird, Weimar, the German Naval officer Corps and National Socialism, pp. 54-55,115-125 for the history and spirit of the naval brigades, many of whom joined the ranks of the new Reichsmarine, According to Siegfried Sorge, Zeugnsschrifttum, Nr. 1785, Institut für Zeitgeschichte 2500 men of the Loewenfeld Naval Brigade joined the new Reichsmarine many as complete units while the members of the more radical Ehrhardt Brigade appear more evenly distributed throughout the navy. Ehrhardt, who led his troops in support of the abortive right wing abortive Putsch against the Republic in 1920, called upon his men “to plant our Brigade spirit in this navy.”


20. Mulligan, Neither Sharks nor Wolves, pp.153-171, analyzes the age of the crews and finds, contrary to accepted interpretations, it was not as young as portrayed and certainly not the “children’s crusade” as Buchheim had charged. Moreover, age and training were not factors in the outcome of the U-Boat war given “Allied successes and German shortcomings.”


24. See Sutter, *Mythos*, pp. 80, 86, 88, 133. See Buchheim’s photographs in *U-Boat War* (New York, 1978) and *Die U-Boot-Fahrer* (Munich, 1985). The fascination with the stealthy hunter (a predatory wolf or shark) circling its victims is not, of course, solely a German phenomenon—the motto for the *Sea Wolf* attack submarine class in the United States is *cave lupum* (beware the wolf).

25. Length of patrols depended upon a range of factors (e.g. distance to the assigned patrol sector) but a post war British study suggested an average of thirty-six days. Mulligan, *Neither Sharks nor Wolves*, pg. 15. For daily life, see Mulligan’s excellent overview, pp. 15-23 and MacLean’s * Dönitz’s Crews*, pp. 14-16 and listing of key sources. Although Buchheim’s books, fiction or non-fiction were mostly rejected by veterans as anti-war “distortions of history” for his view that the U-Boat war was a “war crime” and “Germany’s youth had been wasted, cheated, and deceived,” his descriptions of life aboard a war cruise (*Feindfahrt*) reflected accounts written by those who had served. See Hadley’s well-done summary of the Buchheim controversy in *Count Not the Dead*.


27. Jürgen Rohwer, “The U-boat War against the Allied Supply Lines,” *Decisive Battles of WWII: The German View* (New York, 1965), pp. 263-264. Mulligan, *Neither Sharks nor Wolves*, pp. 58-61, notes that the use of *Rudeltaktik* (group tactics or wolf packs) were not fully utilized until the spring of 1941 when sufficient U-Boats were available and reached its “zenith” in 1942; after May 1943, attacks were primarily carried out by individual U-Boats. See also Günter Hessler, *The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945* (London, 1989) published by the Ministry of Defence as a facsimile edition of Hessler’s three-volume study of U-Boat operations written shortly after the war. Hessler was Dönitz’s son-in-law, a former U-Boat commander and staff for the eleventh flotilla and Flag Officer U-Boat Staff.


34. See Mulligan’s assessment “The Crisis Mastered,” *Neither Sharks nor Wolves*, pp.192-193. Leave to a war-torn Germany living under the Allied air offensive or the savage fighting on land, particular the Eastern Front, put the dangers of U-Boat duty into perspective. See Orth, “Warum weiterkämpfen?”, pg. 175.

35. See Bird, *Erich Raeder*, pp. 91-96 and Salewski, *Das Maritime Dritte Reich: Ideologie und Wirklichkeit 1933-1945*. Die Deutschen und die See, pp. 228-245. Although Dönitz had denied being a member of the Nazi party, he had joined in February 1944 although political involvement was on hold while the soldier was on active duty. See Hartwig, Karl Dönitz, pg. 159-159. Hartwig concurs with the interpretation of Dönitz was a National Socialist (whom Salewski refers to as a “second-generation” Nazi) and shows how he falsely and manipulatively sought to deny any knowledge of the crimes of the party or the consequences of the war in which he had been so much a willing participant. Hartwig also reinforces the critique of recent studies showing Dönitz’s refusal to admit any mistakes in his leadership in the navy that had led to such a
waste of “human material” ( Dönitz’s term), either in the U-Boat War, the sending of ill-equipped and poorly trained naval personnel to the front lines). Rust agrees with Salewski’s interpretation that Dönitz failed to “Nazify” the officer corps and notes only a small number of officers in Crew 34 were “convinced” National Socialists. Naval Officers, pp. 122-126. See Salewski, pp. 241-245, for his assessment of Dönitz’s relationship with Hitler and National Socialism. See the standard work on the navy’s relationship with the Hitler and the Third Reich, Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, (Annapolis, 1990).

36. See Topp’s evaluation of the situation and the German efforts in improving the technology, Fackeln über dem Atlantik, pp. 94-95, 103, and 109.

37. Orth, Warum weiterkämpfen?, pg.175-177.

38. For the navy’s “honor code” and its impact, see Holger Affeuch, “Mit wehender Fahne Untergangen,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 49 (4, 2001), pp. 595-612. See Raeder’s Directive to all commands 22 December 1939, Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, I, pp. 164-165. Dönitz reinforced Raeder’s orders, see Hartwig, Karl Dönitz, pg.143. Dönitz made it clear in November 1942 that the honor of the flag is more important than the lives of individuals in the life, which, in the case of the U-Boats, could apply to an entire crew.


40. See Salewski’s detailed analysis of the efforts to address Germany’s technology and weapons for the new U-Boat War, Seekriegsleitung, II, pp. 467-528. He also points out the on-going inability of the naval command to address the necessary air support to provide support for the U-Boats. Bird, “Karl Dönitz-Der unbesiegte Admiral,” pp. 140-141. Topp, Fackeln über dem Atlantik, pg. 103 and Mulligan, Neither Sharks nor Wolves, pp. 189, 228. Dönitz’s emphasis on “will” reflected the old adage from the first head of the Imperial navy, Albrecht von Stosch, that “men fight, not ships.” This became a factor in both world wars to make up for German deficiencies in analytical operations research and technology innovation. See Salewski’s detailed analysis of the efforts to address Germany’s technology and weapons for the new U-Boat War, Seekriegsleitung, II, pp. 467-528. He also notes the significance of the on-going inability of the naval command to address the necessary air support to provide support for the U-Boats.

41. See Topp, Fackeln über dem Atlantik, pg. 102. See Orth’s evaluation of the limited role of ideology, “Warum weiterkämpfen?”, pp. 180-181. His continuance of the war in his misguided attempts to negotiate a separate peace with the West to fight the Russians only served to increase the loss of lives. The Naval Command placed military needs (and the U-Boat training) as higher priorities than the evacuation efforts—although he later took credit himself for the evacuation efforts—see Hartwig, Karl Dönitz, pp. 125-138.
HUNTER KILLER. OPERACIONES CAZASUBMARINOS, 1939-1945.

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SPENCER COSBY, AGREGADO MILITAR NORTEAMERICANO EN VERDÚN

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Notas

1. The story, although popular, is apocryphal. See Jay Winter’s discussion of the myth in his Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).


4. “Bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 1, Folder 18, October 8, 1914, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

5. “Progress of the War,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 2, Folder 19, June 3, 1915, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

6. “Progress of the War,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 3, Folder 27, December 9, 1915, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.


8. “Progress of the War,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 3, Folder 48, March 8, 1916, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

9. “Progress of the War,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 4, Folder 12, May 31, 1916, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

10. “Progress of the War,” Spencer Cosby Papers, Box 4, Folder 20, July 7, 1916, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.