“LA KAISERLICHE MARINE. ALEMANIA Y LA BÚSQUEDA DEL PODER MUNDIAL 1898-1914”

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BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA


"LA ROYAL NAVY EN GUERRA"
Andrew Lambert (King’s College London)

BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA
“EL HMS DREADNOUGHT
Y LA EVOLUCIÓN DEL ARMA NAVAL”

Tobias Philbin

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BIBLIOGRAFÍA COMPLEMENTARIA


Staff, G. (2016): *Skagerrak, the Battle of Jutland through German Eyes*. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.


“BEATTY CONTRA HIPPER. EL COMBATE ENTRE CRUCEROS DE BATALLA”

Christian Jentzsch
(Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr)

BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA

“LAS FLOTAS FRENTE A FRENTE”

Nicholas Jellicoe

BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA


BIBLIOGRAFÍA COMPLEMENTARIA


"EL DESENLACE NOCTURNO"

Agustín Ramón Rodríguez González (Real Academia de la Historia)

BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA


“DER TAG. EL ENFRENTAMIENTO DEFINITIVO”
Keith Bird (Kentucky Community & Technical College System)

BIBLIOGRAFÍA BÁSICA

BIBLIOGRAFÍA COMPLEMENTARIA
1 In a 1917 article in Scientific American, a German officer insisted that “Der Tag,” an after-dinner toast among the German naval officers to the day when the German navy would take its measure of the British navy, was a “fairy tale” noting the “highest regard” for their English counterparts and the respect for the British navy’s “glorious histories and tradition.” He added that compared to the first “Glorious First of June,” the Germans have now had their First of June 1916 (Jutland/Skagerrak) having “laid low” the namesakes of several of those ships that had fought in the victorious British battle line of 1794. Having “learned much from the English navy,” we were “eager to do our duty” and “show the worth of our fathers” and our thanks to the German people who, “in the past few decades had advanced the growth of its darling child, the fleet” when war broke out in 1914. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-archive/der-tag-an-accusation-of-hostile-intent-1916/ (accessed on October 31, 2018).

See Rahn for the Imperial navy’s confusion as to both the “true purpose” of this hypothetical battle in the German Bight and what would follow from such a “decisive” engagement. See Rahn for the Imperial navy’s confusion as to both the “true purpose” of this hypothetical battle in the German Bight and what would follow from such a “decisive” engagement. Cf. Herbert Rosinski’s scathing assessment of the German theories of sea warfare and Tirpitz’s misconceptions of British intent, the “Decisive Battle”—“an end in itself.” The Risk Theory and command of the sea. The Development of Naval Thought. Ed. by B. Mitchell Simpson III. Newport, 1977, 53-59.

3 See Eva Besteck, Die trügerische “First Line of Defence”. Zum deutsch-britischen Wettrüsten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Freiburg, 2006, for her analysis of the full version of the 1894 formative Dienstschrift IX with its important but often overlooked “tactical-technical” aspects. Tirpitz rejected the arguments of the French Jeune École School and those officers who argued that a Kreuzerkrieg against commerce could produce a victory. See Klaus Franken, Vizeadmiral Kurt Gölser: Ein Kritiker des Schlachtflottenbaus der Kaiserlichen Marine. Bochum, 2011. In his Dienstschrift IX, Tirpitz resolutely states that strategic offensive actions should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet.” Rahn, “.”

4 The British named the battle for the peninsula of Jutland and the Germans for the branch of the North Sea, the Skagerrak (as decreed by Wilhelm II on 11 June 1916).

5 See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916,” The Journal of Military History, 67 (1), 2003; and Herbert Rosinski’s brilliant analysis of how Germany’s “atrophy of strategic thought” stifled the development of a coherent naval strategy before the war. Tirpitz’s flawed strategy with its rigid adherence to fighting a “decisive” battle at sea (an end in itself) reflected a continental mentality and imperialistic Social Darwinist political and economic claims for sea power. Misconstruing a tactical victory with achieving “command of the sea,” the navy’s leaders had no clear instructions for forcing a battle much less revising their strategy. See The Development of Naval Thought. Ed. by B. Mitchell Simpson III. Newport, 1977. See Sebastian Rojek’s description in Versunkene Hoffnungen. Die Deutsche Marine im Umgang mit Erwartungen und Enttäuschungen 1871-1930, Oldenbourg, 1917, of how the unfilled expectations raised by Tirpitz and his supporters would have long-term consequences for the future of the navy.

6 See Frank Nagler’s insightful detailing of the pre-war planning (and current literature) in “Operational and Strategic Plans in the Kaiser’s Navy prior to World War I,” Jutland, 25-62, and Ingenohl’s frank admission in January 1918 on the effect of this “strategic error.” Epenkens, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915,” 120-121. Epenkens’s expert analysis captures the dilemma of the navy and the effect of earlier decisions on the navy’s preparations for war based on Tirpitz’s flawed strategy that had been forced over to the defensive in 1912 and the continuing command problems under Wilhelm’s restrictions. Tirpitz’s machinations and the acquiescence of the Admiralty Staff to both leaders, 126-128.

7 Tirpitz’s concentration on the British home fleet meant that the few warships and commerce raiders, as well as the German colonies, outside of European waters were strategically expendable.

11 See Patrick J. Kelly, *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy; Bloomingtom*. 2010, 366. Tirpitz never altered his conviction that the British would come across the North Sea and present the High Seas Fleet with a favorable opportunity for victory. While there was a growing awareness that a waiting policy by the High Seas Fleet might turn out to be “strategically useless,” Kennedy argues that Tirpitz had “simply transferred his fixed and deterministic way of thinking in political terms into the strategical arena.” “German Naval Operation Plans,” 74.


13 See Epenhans, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915, 119-122 and Doc. 8, Operationsbefehl, Chef des Admiralstabs der Marine an Chef der Hochseestreitkräfte. 30 July 1914, Grenier, Die deutschen Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg. I, Koblenz. 1939. 67-68. In April 1919, an officer reviewing operational planning documents found the 1912 phrase about waiting for “under favourable circumstances” to attack, and angrily wrote in the margin that this directive was “almost bound to prevent a decisive fleet battle from ever occurring”—“the mistake lies here! This restriction upon the freedom of action [of the fleet] existed until 1908, then we conquered it, now it is there again. The central point of the question is: one cannot know beforehand if the opportunity is favorable. Result: wait, wait, wait.” Kennedy, “German Naval Operation Plans,” 193.


17 Jones, “Graf von Spee’s Untergang and the Corporate Identity.” 193-199. Jones describes how the holding back of the fleet and Spee’s heroic defiance of overwhelming forces to sink with flags waving (the concept of Untergang) was a reminder of the sacrifice expected of the navy by their leaders and necessary for the ‘honor and prestige of the navy. The shared corporate identity between officers and men in the fall of 1918 broke down over what appeared as a senseless “last battle” but the cult of Spee became firmly engrained in the naval leadership’s postwar rebuilding of their narrative to boost the navy’s shattered image and prestige.

18 Epenhans, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915,” 121-123. There was never any chance of challenging England for control of the North Sea or alternative Atlantic strategies, especially after the return to the defensive by 1912 and the new priorities of the army as a result of the cost of the naval race and the worsening diplomatic situation -although the Admiralstabanid consider them. Tirpitz thwarted these efforts arguing some alternatives (e. g. the Baltic) were “poison” for the fleet. See Kennedy, “German Naval Operation Plans,” 192-193 and Epenhans, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915.” 131-132.

19 Ibid., 123-124. The most recent study of Dogger Bank is Tobias R. Philbin’s *Battle of Dogger Bank: The First Dreadnought Engagement January 1915*. Bloomingtom. 2014. Admiral von Pohl was a supporter of the U-boat commerce war when he was head of the Admiral Staff and his supporters expected him to deploy the Fleet more vigorously as well. Both efforts failed in 1915 as the fleet misfired (see below) and, after a vigorous debate internally, the navy discontinued the unlimited U-boat war in light of loss of civilians especially from the United States. While Admiral von Pohl’s short sorties showed that the fleet was still tactically ready, they had no contact with the enemy nor any strategic effect. see Rahn, “Strategische Probleme der deutschen Seekriegführung 1914-1918,” *Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung. Wahrnehmung. Analyse*, Munich and Zurich, Piper, 1994, p. 351.
20 See the roles of Levetzow and Trotha, leaders in the search for scapegoats, who were key members of the pro-Tirpitz and Scheer cabal who sought to subvert the first two fleet commanders and supported Scheer. Gerhard Granier’s *Magnus von Levetzow: Seeoffizier, Monarchist, und Wegbereiter Hitlers*. Boppard, 1982, 12-13, 204-215; Epkenhans, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915,” 126 and Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” 145.

21 See Epkenhans, “Imperial Navy 1914-1915,” 126 and 132-33 and Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” Jutland, 145-147, for statements from Levetzow and Admiral Karl Schumann II decrying the navy’s passivity “and call for action and Scheer’s agreement with Pohl’s doing “nothing” (Schumann) and the failings resulting from Germany and the navy’s fragmented structural and command problems.


24 See Kleikamp, Einfluß, pp. 18-22 and Scheer’s operation orders for the limited use of wireless before the Battle of Jutland, *Kommando der Hochseestreitkräfte, Operationsbesetlhr Nr. 6 vom 28. Mai 1916*, Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann and Frank Nägler, eds., Skagerrakschlacht. Munich, 2011, 199-204. By foregoing the use of radio to signal major operations, Scheer believed Room 40 would keep the British uncertain as to what the German plans were in the North Sea and give limited opportunities to prepare countermeasures. Kleikamp also regarded Scheer as being more aggressive in engaging elements of the Grand Fleet and seeking opportunities to catch its ships by surprise.

25 See Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” 145 and Doc. 184, Aufzeichnung des Kommandos der Hochseestreitkräfte. 1 March 1916, Granier, *Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, II, 81-82. The “helplessness” that Epkenhans’ saw with the Admiralstab in the summer of 1916 was still evident owing to what Rahn called the “insufficient concepts” of the naval command whose “strategic incompetence” made them incapable of recognizing the natural limits that existed” for any German naval strategy. “German Navies from 1848 to 2016: Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation,” Naval War College Review, 70, (4, 2017). 29.

26 See Doc. 186, Scheer to Vice Admiral Harald Dähnhardt, 12 March 1916, Granier, *Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, II, 87-91. See Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” 146-147. The threat of the High Seas Fleet, for example, diverted destroyers from British anti-submarine operations.

27 Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” 146-147.

28 Although Scheer was still under similar limitations and options as his predecessors, Rahn argues his command of most of the navy’s U-boats gave him more influence than the Kaiser’s other direct reports in the navy. Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective.” 146. See the background for Scheer’s operations and key documents in Granier, *Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, 79-109.

29 Given the navy’s fears for its future, the High Seas Fleet’s role of a “fleet-in-being” served as a “deterrent factor” for the support of the U-boat economic war. Scheer had wanted to intensify the commerce war and the German concessions to the United States. While Scheer worried about the enemy intercepting his messages, he was not aware that Room 40 and the Admiralty knew when and approximately where each U-boat was deployed through code-breaking and direction-finding. From their routines of sending messages when they reached their patrol area for attacking shipping, the British suspected a fleet operation. See Jason Hines, “Sins of Omission and Commission.” 1117–1154. Cf. Hans Joachim Koever, Ed. Room 40: German Naval Warfare 1914-1918. 2 Vols. Steinbach, 2008-2009.

30 Salewski, “Reflections,” 370-371. While the British current “strength ratio” precluded the fleet from seeking battle “initially” (Levetzow), they must prevent the Grand Fleet from imposing a decisive battle on the High Seas Fleet from being imposed on German forces and Scheer sought not to seek a decisive battle on the enemy’s terms which “contradicts the simplest strategic principle” to attack with superior power at the place he chooses.
31 Ibid.


33 For Beatty, Jutland was not an “occur” demonstration of British command of the seas—a feeling, he wrote, expressing the suffering of the navy’s leadership staff “far greater than disappointment, depressed beyond measure.” To atone for the unsatisfactory result” of the Battle of Jutland, he corrected this with the awesome spectacle of leading the German High Seas Fleet to Scapa Flow to present the British public with a “triumph and great English victory”—the British “Der Tag” of surrender. The officers would have preferred a “decisive battle” victory, not a victory of the blockade. See Rojek, Versunkene Hoffnungen, 240-242 and Watz, Das Lange Warten, 440-441.

34 The German report omitted the loss of the battlecruiser Lützow and the light cruisers and . Rojek describes the public relations campaign over Jutland after the Admiralstab on the morning of 1 June 1916 issued a formal press communiqué listing the heavy British losses while downplaying their own. In response, a terse British Admiralty statement on 3 June 1916, appeared to confirm the German accounts of the battle and the heavier British losses. See Rojek, Versunkene Hoffnungen 158-173 for the German initial reaction and the skepticism of public opinion towards later press releases and propaganda over the following year (which also occurred in England).


36 See Rahn’s table on Losses, Ammunition Expenditure, and Hits, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective,” 186; Holger Herwig, “Jutland, Acrimony to Resolution,” Naval War College Review, 69, (4, 2016) reports the battle involved 151 British ships of 1,700 guns and 60,000 sailors and 100 German ships of 900 guns and 45,000 sailors.

37 In tonnage, the numbers vary from 113,300 to 62,300 or 115,025 to 61,180 but reinforce the British heavy material losses. Although gunnery effectiveness data vary according to various sources, the German fired fewer shells, (e.g. 3597 to 4534, but they had 122 hits for an accuracy of 3.39 % compared to the 123 British hits and 2.71% accuracy). For the extensive technical data collected to evaluate performance and allowing for updates, see John Brook’s extensive tables in his 2016 The Battle of Jutland. Cambridge, UK who includes details on the ships that fought in the battle and their performance (for a listing of his numerous tables, see ix-xii) and John Campbell’s exhaustive technical account of gunnery and its effectiveness during the battle, Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, London, 1986, which is still the authoritative technical account of gunnery and its effectiveness during the battle.

38 Hipper Nachlass, N 165/10, Bundesarchiv-Militär Archiv (BAMA).

39 See Nicolas Jellicoe’s well-balanced and nuanced study, Jutland: The Unfinished Battle (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK, 2018, especially for his analysis of the motives of the leaders of both fleets. He also had access to new sources including a letter from Jellicoe (Jutland, 220) writing down his reactions a few days after the battle that are different from his later public statements that were more designed for morale purposes (especially for the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet). See also Jellicoe’s excellent website Jutland Centenary initiative, http://www.jutland1916.com/. Jellicoe argues since the issue was sea power, keeping the strategic status quo was a victory for the British. The press releases didn’t help as Jutland felt the public reaction was like a yo-yo—at first, Jutland was a defeat, then it was a “second Trafalgar” (Jutland, 220). See Herwig’s superb thought provoking review essay of the recent literature, “Jutland: Acrimony to Resolution,” Naval War College Review, 69 (4, 2016), 1-8. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1478&context=nwc-review (accessed 15 December 2018). Books reviewed Jutland: The Naval Staff Appreciation, ed. William Schlehauf. Barnsley, UK, 2016; The Jutland Scandal: The Truth about the First World War’s Greatest Sea Battle, by J. E. T. Harper and Sir Reginald Bacon. Barnsley UK, 2016; Jutland: The Unfinished Battle, by Nicholas Jellicoe. Barnsley, UK, 2016.

40 Rojak quoting the author Viktor Klemperer, Versunkene Hoffnungen, 173. This waning of enthusiasm for Jutland may have been a factor as noted by Michael Epkenhans who pointed out that the war’s “long duration” before and at the mid-point of the conflict may have suggested Jutland was “superfluous”—a singular event. contrary to the expectation (and disappointment) of both navies. See his “Foreword” in Nicholas Jellicoe Jutland: The Unfinished Battle, viii.
41 Doc. 2 “Immediatericht [report to Kaiser] of 4 July 1916 from the Commander of the High Seas Battle Forces Concerning the Naval Battle near Skagerfärken.” Rahn, “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective,” 193-207 especially the closing section “F. Future Naval Warfare, 206-207 and Scheer’s recognition of the disadvantages of Germany’s geographical position and the consequences of Germany’s military inferiority in the face of a blockade, a foreshadowing of the future of “Total War.” His post-battle reports also noted, in addition to command and control of the fleets and gunnery issues, the tactical difficulties of the modern technologies (e.g. torpedoes, wireless, etc.) and their lessons for future doctrine and strategy, 207-213. Scheer, like many of his officers (and other German leaders), continually underestimated the American opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare as they did with the possible entry of the United States into the war and its role in Germany’s defeat. See footnote 45 below.

42 Jellicoe was at once ready the next day to deploy a minimum of 24 capital ships. German shipyard capacity was also an issue for all the heavy repairs needed and not all units were ready for the first operation in August. Some refits were make-shift such as the concrete covering over the hole in Seydlitz’s Bertha turret. See Gary Staff, , Annapolis, 2014, 187.

43 See James Goldrick, After Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, June 1916-November 1918, Annapolis, 2018, for his detailed expert analysts of the post-Jutland operations and the intentions of the two fleets and the results of their endeavors. Resumption of German operations in August and the absence of any contact between the fleet (Room 40 continued to provide warnings) showed how difficult another chance encounter between the main battle fleets would be to accomplish given the objectives of the leadership of both navies. For the Germans, coordination with the U-boats in fleet operations proved problematic as well as issues with Zeppelin reconnaissance and having sufficient resources to equip and keep the increasing worn-down units at sea. Goldrick also raises the larger issue of the severe shortages in material and skilled labor along with the inefficiencies of the German federal system and other competing demands of the army. These problems and the interaction between industry, scientists and inventors were present in the development of air ships, aircraft and naval intelligence and deserve more attention in the fleet’s performance later in the war. See John H. Morrow’s studies of the aircraft industry in Germany and other countries during the war (e.g. The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921, Shrewsbury, 1993); “The Last Sortie of the German High Sea Fleet—April 1918.” 25 Apr 2018, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute newsletter (www.aspistrategist.org.au).

44 Lieutenant Ernst von Weizsäcker, diary entry from 27 September 1916, quoted by Rahn, “German Navies,” 54.

45 See Holger Herwig’s “Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany’s U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918.” Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 Ed. by Roger Chickering and . Oxford, 2006 for his succinct analysis of the navy’s imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare against the British economy based on miscalculations that “guaranteed” victory. Their underestimation of enemy resources and dismissal of the American entry into the war would have was a fatal error along with their continued overestimation of their capabilities. Marcus König’s Agitation - Zensor - Propaganda: Der U-Boot-Krieg und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit im Ersten Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, 2014 describes in detail the “peak of agitation” for unrestricted submarine warfare and the role of public opinion in the navy’s successful pressuring of the political leadership.

46 James Goldrick, “The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet—April 1918.”


48 For the controversy over whether “Operation Albion,” a singularly unique amphibious (and cooperation with the army), represented little more than a tactical exercise against an already defeated foe and a morale booster for the participating forces detached from the High Seas Fleet that had seen too little action, or whether the costs of resources, loss and damage (“overkill”) justified the results, see Holger Herwig’s “Luxury Fleet” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, London, 1980 and Michael Barrett’s Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands. Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2008. Gérard P. Gross, who “corrected” the Marine-Archiv’s official naval history (Vom Krieg in der Nordsee: Vom Sommer 1917 bis zum Kriegsende 1918, Der Krieg zur See, Vol. 7, Critical Edition. Hamburg, Berlin, and Bonn, 2006) that excluded the navy’s cover-up of the mutinies demonstrates how the Admiralstab also used “Operation Albion” to try to create a much-needed unified

49 See Michael Epkenhans’ excellent introductory biography of Scheer in Mein lieber Schatz! Briefe von Admiral Reinhard Scheer an seine Ehefrau August bis November 1918. Böchum, 2006, 45 for the admiral’s reaction to the new government and the army’s demand for peace. The self-centeredness and independence of the navy contributed to Germany’s inability to develop a Grand Strategy in two world wars and lack of coordination with the army and after 1935, the Luftwaffe. See Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann and Frank Nagler. Introduction, Jutland, 3-4.


51 Salewski, “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,” 19. Beatty and Jellicoe expected that Scheer and the High Seas fleet were “programmed to carry out the ritual of the ‘heroic Untergang’” and were bitterly disappointed in Scheer’s battle turn-arounds which they “considered cowardly.”

52 Salewski, “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,” 19. Beatty and Jellicoe expected that Scheer and the High Seas fleet were “programmed to carry out the ritual of the ‘heroic Untergang’” and were bitterly disappointed in Scheer’s battle turn-arounds which they “considered cowardly.”

53 The annihilation of Admiral von Spee’s East Asia Far East Squadron “with waving flags” at the Falklands in December 1914 became transformed during the war into an integral part of the navy’s identity and its symbol of selfless sacrifice (and its significance after 1918 as a way of putting the navy in a more positive light). Jones, “Graf von Spee’s Untergang and the Corporate Identity,” 183-189. Holger Afflerbach elaborates on the persistence of the navy’s “Refusal to Capitulate” from 1914 to 1945 and its transformation into a deep-seated apocalyptic belief —that a heroic sacrifice (defeat) would result in a future existence (Goethe’s Stirb und Werde), “‘Mit Wehender Fahne Untergehen,’ Kapitulationsverweigerungen in der deutschen Marine,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 49 (October 2001), 595-612. Jones also regards this development as a key element in the navy’s war culture and the redemptive nature of its “performance violence.” Salewski combines these themes as the “Exoriare-Motif,” defeat and resurrection, symbolic of the officers’ desire for revenge, closely tied to their anti-republican antipathy and the stab-in-the-back myth. “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,” 13-14. Hillmann states that the naval leadership believed that the October 1918 operation was a chance to save the navy’s honor by defeating the Grand Fleet—which “even Scheer did not believe possible”—or sink heroically, “Remembering the Battle of Jutland in Germany,” Jutland, 317.

Edition, Hamburg, Berlin, and Bonn, 2006, which showed how the navy marginalized or misrepresented sensitive events (e.g. the mutinies). The after-battle accounts of the officers hailed the crews for their courage and role in the battle but failed to show their ability to recognize or build on the morale boost of the crews. Cf. the positive diary entries of Richard Stumpf before and after the success of Jutland compared to his pessimistic assessment of the mood of the crews in 1917-1918. Horn, Daniel, Ed. and Trans. War, Mutiny, and Revolution in the German Navy. The World War I Diary of Seaman Richard Stumpf. New Brunswick, N.J. 1967.

Note the examples of the loss of the Bismarck, the Scharnhorst and Hitler’s naming of Großadmiral Karl Dönitz as head of state in 1945 (ironically, after the scuttling of the Graf Spee in December 1939, Admiral Raeder ordered that once engaged all ships were to fight to the end—dying gallantly.” See Michael Salewski “Das maritimen Dritten Reich. Ideologie und Wirklichkeit 1933-1945,” Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik 1848-1945. Herford, 1985 and Bird, Erich Raeder. Admiral of the Third Reich, Annapolis, 2006, 193.


The German accounts from officers and sailors interned at Scapa Flow tried to link the victory at Skagerrak to the scuttling, an attempt Jones argues, shows how the attempts to “insert honor in the narrative” including claims that the sinking of one of the battleships that played a role in the mutinies had “extinguished” its shame by scuttling.” From ‘Skagerrak’ to the ‘Organisation Consul’: War Culture and the Imperial German Navy,” Other-Combatants. Other-Fronts: Competing Histories of the First World War. Ed. by James E. Kitchen, Alisa Miller and Laura Rowe. Newcastle upon Tyne, 2011. 268-269. The first head of the West German navy, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, called the “heroic” saving of the honor of the navy at Scapa Flow as the defining moment for his career, Scapa Flow 1919. Das Ende der deutschen Flotte. Oldenburg, 1969. Hillmann, “Remembering the Battle of Jutland in Germany,” 317. The scuttling, however, increased naval reparations and reduced the navy to the status of a “coastal navy. When the German peace negotiators offered to forsake a navy in return for other concessions, the Allies refused. See Bird, Weimar, 60-65.


See Rojek’s Versunkene Hoffnungen, an in-depth sociological-based study of the origins and effects of the widespread expectations for the navy and how the officers shaped their history as myth beginning during the war and after. Not admitting any fundamental errors of strategic or operational judgement, except privately, the naval leadership continued to fixate on the battleship (as Scheer did while expecting results from the U-boats in the economic war against England) in the development of naval strategy after 1918 and the role of surface battle. In the spring of 1917 anticipating a German victory, Admiral von Capelle, Tirpitz’s successor in the RMA, was also considering plans for a special cemetery for Germany’s existing U-Boats presumably expecting to return to the emphasis on building capital ships in the navy’s continuing efforts to be a world sea power. See Holger Herwig, “Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany’s U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918,” passim.

Rahn correctly counters arguments that the navy performed no useful strategic but pointedly notes out its failure from a “realistic cost-benefit analysis.” “The Battle of Jutland from the German Perspective,” Cf. Rojek’s in-depth sociological-based study of the origins and effects of the widespread expectations for the navy and the consequences of the deep disappointment in its wartime performance and how the officers shaped their history as myth beginning during the war and after, subsequently refusing any to accept any responsibility or permit any internal criticism.


64 The navy eagerly seized (and cataloged) any professional and popular accounts favorable to their actions during Jutland, reflecting their pride in their proving that had fulfilled their long-held goal of naval equality with the yardstick of naval power, the Royal Navy. Concerned about critics might question their actions (e.g. breaking off contact multiple times), they read with relief, for example, Sir Julian Corbett’s comment that Scheer’s performance had placed him “on the same plane as the great fleet commanders of all times.” Salewski, “Reflections,” 374-375.

65 See Jann M. Witt, 125 Jahre Deutscher Marinebund, Berlin, 2016, 42-51, 68-72,91-96 and 151-160 for all the changes in the meaning of Laboe from the “Skagerrak memorial” in Weimar, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic and Hillmann, “Remembering the Battle of Jutland in Germany,” 327-330.

66 In 1998, after first raising the question in the late 1960s, the naval leadership succeeded in a formal recognition (and “official birthdate”) of 14 June of the short-lived Reichsflotte 1848-1853, founded by the Frankfurt Parliament and flying the same colors of the Federal Republic, as the “first German fleet.” June 14th now replaced Skagerrak-Day. Hillmann, “Remembering the Battle of Jutland,” 310. Both Salewski’s autobiography, Marine und Geschichte. Eine persönliche Auseinandersetzung, Bonn, 2011, and the “Foreword to First Edition” of Jutland, viii, written by Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Sticker (Commander-in-Chief, 2005-2011) attest to the navy’s struggle to engage objectively with its past—a process that would prove to be painful as it was long. For Salewski, it was the officer’s reaction to his discussion of the navy’s role in the Third Reich to Sticker’s story of how the officer’s “naval history handbook” had in 1966 asserted the German victory at Jutland and its statement that the British side had had to swallow “an embarrassing defeat.” The navy’s “instrumentalization” of its history from the Tirpitz Era to the early years of the Bundesmarine continued the myth of Jutland in its tradition and honoring of heroes from Jutland (e.g. naming ships, harbors and installations, etc.).

67 The Defense Ministry had not updated the Decree on Tradition for the German armed forces since 1982 during which the military had developed its own tradition over 60 years. The new Decree on Tradition, prompted by right-wing activities and the appearance of symbols and reminders of the military’s history before the founding of the Federal Republic, resulted in discussions that made it clear that there are only three sources of tradition for the Bundeswehr: the Prussian reformers (Clausewitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau); the July 44 plotters (and those who can be added to that group by their resistance to the Nazi regime); and especially the long-term history of the post-war Bundeswehr (e.g. the renaming of a base after a fallen soldier in Afghanistan). See the Tagesschau.de program article (28.03.2018 12:16 Uhr), “Neuer Traditionserlass. Das Militär und sein Erbe.” In contrast, the tradition of the German Democratic Republic’s Volksmarine celebrated the mutinying German sailors as revolutionaries and forerunners of the East German communist state and memorialized the two “martyrs” executed by the navy.

68 The most significant and symbolic of the renovations beginning in 2015 was turning the seating in the Great Hall 180° to face away from the view of the memorial plaques listing the fallen naval officers (dedicated June 1923). The two commemorative quotes on the plaques admonished future officers: “Do not complain/ Dare Once more/Seafaring is necessary” (Gorch Fock) and “May an avenger someday arise from our bones” (Virgil’s Aeneid). See “Unsere Aula—Ein Denk Mal’ und Nur ein Denkmal,” 28 September 2016, newsletter of REUNION Marine (https://reunion-marine.de/meldungen/umgestaltung-der-aula-der-marineschule-muerwik/) (accessed on 15 July 2018) and Salewski, “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ulter.” 13-15. These thoughts of revenge and rebuilding the navy were the focus of the building of the navy memorial at Laboe, see Witt’s description of the laying of the cornerstone on 8 August 1927, 125 Jahre Deutscher Marinebund, 47-49.

69 Olaf Rahardt’s In Erinnerungen an die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak 1916/2016, Martenshagen, 2016 includes details of the commemoration (events on board, the port visits to both nations and on-shore memorials). See Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Sticker’s description of the Royal Navy organized memorial service on 31 May 2006 in the North Sea at 5765.0N3-00939.0E1 compared to a similar meeting of British and German ships at Jutland which took place in a larger ceremonial context with more immediacy of the event that included Jutland veterans and the need to show British and German “solidarity,” Introduction, Jutland, vi-viii.
"LA RESISTENCIA FRENTE AL DÍA D"

Marc Laurenceau

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